|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|||||||||||
| by
Björn
Hagelin,
Pieter
D. Wezeman,
Siemon
T. Wezeman
and Nicholas Chipperfield About the authors Project homepage |
||||||||||||
|
* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Major conventional
arms transfers in the period 1998–2002 remained at a post-cold
war low. Despite an increase in the period 2000–2002, the
five-year moving average for 2002 was the lowest so far. The
five largest suppliers in the period 1998–2002 accounted
for about 80% of major conventional arms transfers. While the
trend for Russia has constantly increased since 1998, that for
the USA has constantly decreased. France, Germany and the UK
show varied trends over recent years. The USA was
the largest supplier in 1998–2002 with 41% of global deliveries.
Russia accounted for 22% of total arms transfers, which gave
it second place. However, for the second year in a row, Russia
was the largest supplier, with 36% of global deliveries in that
year. China was the fourth largest supplier in 2002, which was
a major change from previous years. It accounted for 5% of all
deliveries—mainly as a result of its deliveries of combat
aircraft to Pakistan. Among the
major arms recipients were countries involved in wars against
terrorism. The initial focus of military action was on Afghanistan,
but intra-state conflicts in other parts of the world were redefined
during 2002 by their respective governments in an attempt to
gain legitimacy for their actions. Taken together, the cases
studied did not support the hypothesis that levels of major arms
transfers would be higher because of anti-terrorist deliveries
in 2002. In fact, most transfers of major conventional weapons
during 2002 were the result of decisions taken before September
2001. It is uncertain
how important anti-terrorist activities will be for the future
trend in transfers of major weapons. On the one hand, major weapons
might not be the most effective means for fighting terrorism.
On the other hand, if military anti-terrorist activities multiply
and become long, drawn-out operations, continued deliveries involving
major weapons may be regarded as necessary in order to increase
the chances of success. This could lead to new or additional
legislation or reduced political willingness to implement arms
export controls restrictively vis-à-vis certain countries.
Should that happen, it could become increasingly difficult to
distinguish between a legitimate ambition to support anti-terrorism
abroad and attempts to help indigenous military companies to
find foreign markets. Even without major long-term changes to
that effect, low-level ad hoc transfers of major weapons could
become important for smaller suppliers and make a substantial
contribution to the military capability of particular recipients.
It is not certain that such developments will support regional
stability. To that should be added problems with illegal transfers.
There are
also problems with implementing UN arms embargoes. There is a
need for further development of instruments for enforcement,
not only by closing legal loopholes but also by cooperating and
coordinating the monitoring of arms transfers from departure
to arrival at the authorized final destination. Although few
significant new developments took place in national arms transfers
reporting during 2002, the EU showed a willingness to create
more public transparency in arms transfers. Nonetheless, more
scope for openness remains, not least at the regional level.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons is also a first step
that could develop into an open and public report, also including
transfers of small arms outside the OSCE area. Appendices 13A, 13B and 13C provide data on the transfers of major conventional weapons.
Appendix
13E, by Peter C. Evans, explores the role of export credits and
guarantees in the financing of arms sales. Easy credit
for military equipment buyers induced by the competition between
supplier states is the norm rather than the exception in the
international arms market. Financing has emerged as an important
factor in winning the large military equipment orders arising
from NATO enlargement. The Polish competition for fighter jet
aircraft, won by Lockheed Martin in December 2002 with the support
of a $3.8 billion loan authorization from the US Government,
illustrates the mixed incentives that drive supplier states to
offer subsidized export financing. Only limited effort has been
made internationally to extend export credit financing disciplines
to the military sector. |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
